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Abstract
In 2010 sponsored search advertisements generated over $12 billion in revenue for
search engines in the US market and accounted for 46% of online advertising revenue.
A substantial portion of this revenue was generated by the sale of search keywords
using an auction mechanism. We analyze a game-theoretic model to understand the
interplay between organic and sponsored links in keyword auctions. Our model allows
both the relevance of the advertising ￿rm as well as the position of its sponsored link
to impact click-through-rates. Our results demonstrate how the presence of organic
links (links generated by the search engine algorithm) may lead to either more or less
aggressive bidding for sponsored link positions depending on consumer attitudes toward
sponsored links and the extent to which sponsored and organic links are complements
or substitutes. In contrast to equilibrium results in existing literature, the ￿rm with
the highest value per click does not necessarily win the ￿rst spot in the sponsored
search listings. It also may be optimal for a ￿rm to bid an amount greater than the
expected value (or sale) from a click.
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Consumers often access information about ￿rms in online markets through a commercial
search website such as Google.com, Yahoo.com or Bing.com. Sponsored search advertising
enables ￿rms to display sponsored ads above organic results produced by the search engine
(SE) to improve visibility to customers.1 Sponsored search provides a balance between
several concerns. Because sponsored links are displayed together with organic links, from
the user￿ s perspective they appear less intrusive than other types of ads such as pop-up
windows or E-mail advertising. From the advertiser￿ s perspective, sponsored search provides
the ability to target customers based on a search query which results in more quali￿ed tra¢ c
viewing sponsored ads. Finally, sponsored search typically entails a cost-per-click payment
under which advertisers only incur a charge if a consumer clicks on the sponsored link.2 In
2010 sponsored search advertisements generated over $12 billion in revenue for search engines
in the US market and accounted for 46% of online advertising revenue (Source IAB). Many
of these advertisements are sold through keyword auctions.
Our paper examines how organic and sponsored links impact the equilibrium bidding
strategies in keyword auctions when customers can access a ￿rm￿ s website by clicking on
either a sponsored or an organic link (generated by the search engine algorithm) appearing
in the search results produced by the SE: To incorporate the impact of the relevance of each
￿rm to searching consumers, the probability that a searching customer will click on either a
sponsored or organic link di⁄ers for each ￿rm. Our analysis highlights two e⁄ects of sponsored
links. A location e⁄ect shifts clicks away from organic links to sponsored links because
sponsored links are placed at the top of the search results page, and they move organic links
further down the page. The location e⁄ect may be exacerbated or o⁄set by the degree to
which sponsored and organic links are perceived by consumers as substitutes or complements.
Regardless of location, the nature of the keyword (generic, brand-speci￿c, popular, niche)
and the text accompanying the sponsored link may a⁄ect the relationship between sponsored
and organic links. For some keywords, sponsored links serve as a substitute for organic links,
whereas for other keywords, sponsored links complement organic links and lead customers
1See Evans(2007, 2011) for a survey on the economics of online advertising.
2See Taylor(2010) for an economic rationale for current payment schemes in the online advertising indus-
try. See also Moon and Kwon (2011) and Zhu and Wilbur (2010) for the advantages of cost-per-click (CPC)
vs cost-per-thousand impressions (CPM) schemes for the advertiser and the publisher.
1to click on both the sponsored and organic link to a given ￿rm. Our analysis characterizes
how the relevance (to searching consumers) of organic and sponsored links, and the expected
value of a click to each ￿rm interact to determine equilibrium bidding strategies.
We ￿nd that the presence of organic links in the search results can lead to more ag-
gressive bidding in keyword auctions if sponsored and organic links are su¢ ciently strong
complements. We also show that the ￿rm which is most relevant or has the highest value per
click does not necessarily win the ￿rst spot in the sponsored search listings. Under certain
conditions, a less popular ￿rm may use a sponsored link to increase its tra¢ c while a more
popular ￿rm relies only on its organic links to attract customers. In addition, for some para-
meterizations of our model, ￿rms adopt mixed strategies. In contrast to previous papers, the
mixed strategies apply not to the bids submitted by each website but to the decision about
whether or not to participate in the keyword auction. Our results imply that equilibrium
outcomes for a given keyword can generate no sponsored links, a single sponsored link, or
multiple sponsored links. The extent to which sponsored and organic links are complements
or substitutes along with location e⁄ects also creates an important role for the reservation
price (minimum cost-per-click) established by the search engine.
Our game-theoretic approach models the interplay between organic and sponsored links
without restrictive assumptions on the characteristics of keywords or consumer preferences,
and incorporates a range of possible consumer perceptions of sponsored and organic links
consistent with empirical studies. For example, Ghose and Yang (2009) ￿nd that retailer-
speci￿c and brand-speci￿c information in a sponsored link increases the e¢ ciency of online
advertising. Yang and Ghose (2010) also show that organic and sponsored links tend to
be positively interdependent. In particular, total click-through rates, conversions rates, and
revenues are signi￿cantly higher when both sponsored and organic links to the ￿rm appear
on the search results page. However, Reiley, Li and Lewis (2010) ￿nd that sponsored links
may substitute for organic links. Agarwal et. al. (2008) also show that while the click-
through-rate decreases with position, the conversion rate ￿rst increases and then decreases
with position for longer keywords. They conclude that the top positions in sponsored search
advertisements are not necessarily the optimal positions for advertisers. Complementary to
these studies, Rutz and Bucklin (2011) investigate the interactions between several types
of keywords (generic versus branded keywords), and ￿nd that generic keywords may induce
2positive spillovers on the e⁄ectiveness (measured by click-through rate) of branded keywords.
Similarly, Jeziorski and Segal (2009) and Chiou and Tucker (2010) show the prevalence
of externalities across ads meaning that the click-through-rate on a given ad in a given
position depends on which ads are shown in other positions as well as the words used in the
text of these ads. Finally, Edelman and Gilchrist (2011) ￿nd that click-through-rates are
in￿ uenced by the labeling of paid links (for example replacing ￿sponsored link￿with ￿ad￿or
￿paid advertisement￿ ). Our theoretical model is built on this empirical literature and aims
at understanding how consumer attitude towards sponsored links (i.e. clicking behavior)
in￿ uences competition in search advertising.
Our results characterize bidding strategies in a ￿generalized second-price￿(GSP) keyword
auction with a positive reserve price when the relevance of both the organic and sponsored
links (and the corresponding probabilities that consumers click on these links) di⁄ers across
￿rms, and the value of a click also can di⁄er across ￿rms. Following the seminal papers of
Edelman,Ostrovski & Schwartz (2007) and Varian (2007), a growing literature has analyzed
keyword auctions and search advertising strategies (Athey & Ellison, 2011; Agarwal et al.
2006; Animesh et al. 2010; Chen, De & Whinston, 2009; Katona & Sarvary, 2009; Taylor,
2009; Xu, Chen & Whinston, 2009; Zhang & Feng, 2011). Our analysis incorporates organic
links in the framework of Edelman et. al. and Varian and is closest in spirit to recent work
by Katona and Sarvary (2009) and Xu et al. (2009). Katona and Sarvary (2009) show that
under certain conditions a less relevant ￿rm may outbid more relevant ￿rms to win the top
position in the sponsored listings. In contrast to their analysis in which all ￿rms participate
in the keyword auction, the ￿rm￿ s decision to participate in a keyword auction is endogenous
in our model and depends upon the minimum cost per click established by the SE as well as
the relevance of both organic and sponsored links to searching consumers. Xu et al. (2009)
analyze two asymmetric ￿rms that di⁄er with respect to their organic ranking and compete
in the product market. Like us, they ￿nd that bidding strategies depend on the relevance
of the ￿rm￿ s organic and sponsored listings, but the keyword auction they consider awards
the ￿rst sponsored link for a ￿xed payment (and awards the second sponsored position at
no charge). In contrast, our model considers the impact of cost-per-click pricing on bidding
behavior and incorporates a minimum cost-per-click for any sponsored link, consistent with
the policies of search engines like Google and Yahoo! Our model also explores the impact
3of the speci￿c channel (organic or sponsored link) through which customers visit a site on
equilibrium bidding decisions, rather than considering only the total probability of attracting
a customer when sponsoring a link. Because an advertising ￿rm incurs a cost for each click on
its sponsored link, while clicks on organic links are free, directly accounting for the channel
through which a customer reaches a ￿rm￿ s website is integral to equilibrium bidding behavior.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 explains the nature of keyword auctions and
analyzes bidding strategies. Section 4 characterizes the di⁄erent equilibrium outcomes. Sec-
tion 5 illustrates our results with a numerical example. Section 6 discusses our results and
concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a duopoly market with sponsored search advertising with two ￿rms i = 1;2 and
a single search engine. We extend models of position auctions (Edelman et. al. (2007) and
Varian (2007)) to incorporate organic search listings and to allow ￿rm relevance to di⁄er for
organic and sponsored links. In our duopoly setting, there are n = 4 possible positions on
the search results page. Each position k 2 f1;2;3;4g has a position speci￿c parameter xk
that measures the quality of this position, where xk ￿ xk+1; and 1 ￿ xk > 0:
2.1 Search Results and Click-Through-Rates
To incorporate di⁄erences in ￿rm relevance, the position speci￿c parameter is adjusted by a
￿rm speci￿c factor to determine the click-through-rate (CTR) for each ￿rm/position speci￿c
combination. In particular, let ￿i denote the ￿rm relevance factor for an organic link to
￿rm i, where 1 ￿ ￿1 > ￿2 > 0: Because ￿rm 1 is more relevant than ￿rm 2, the organic
(unsponsored) results produced by the search engine always list ￿rm 1 before ￿rm 2: When
neither ￿rm sponsors a link, ￿rm 1￿ s organic link appears in position 1, ￿rm 2￿ s organic link
in position 2, and the CTRs are ￿1x1 and ￿2x2 for ￿rms 1 and 2, respectively.
In addition to providing organic search listings, the search engine conducts an auction
to sell sponsored links which are listed in the highest positions. If only one of the two ￿rms
wins a sponsored link, then this link appears in the ￿rst position and the organic listings
to ￿rm 1 and then ￿rm 2 appear in the second and third positions. Because the relevance
of links may di⁄er for sponsored and organic links, let ￿i denote the ￿rm speci￿c e⁄ect of a
4sponsored link to ￿rm i where 1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2 > 0:3 If ￿rm i has a sponsored link in position
k 2 f1;2g; then the CTR for that link is ￿ixk: If both ￿rms sponsor links, then the SE
must determine which sponsored link appears ￿rst. The sponsored links occupy the ￿rst
two positions followed by the organic links to ￿rm 1 and then ￿rm 2 in the third and fourth
positions.
To allow for the possibility that sponsored links might be either complements or substi-
tutes for organic links, let ￿i be a ￿rm speci￿c adjustment to the relevance of the organic
link to ￿rm i when that link appears after a sponsored link to ￿rm i; the CTR for an organic
link to ￿rm i in position k following a sponsored link to ￿rm i is ￿i￿ixk: If ￿i < 1; then the
sponsored link serves as a substitute for the organic link in the sense that the presence of a
sponsored link reduces the ￿rm-speci￿c relevance of the organic link. Similarly, ￿i > 1 if the
sponsored link complements ￿rm i￿ s organic link by increasing its relevance. Our assump-
tions about consumer behavior generate click through rates which depend upon the number
of sponsored links and the position of each ￿rm in the sponsored links as depicted in Table
1. The number in parentheses denotes the ￿rm located in the corresponding position.
Table 1: Click-Through-Rates by Position
Firms Sponsoring Links
Position None Firm 1 Firm 2 Both, Firm 1 First Both, Firm 2 First
1 ￿1x1 (1) ￿1x1 (1) ￿2x1 (2) ￿1x1 (1) ￿2x1 (2)
2 ￿2x2 (2) ￿1￿1x2 (1) ￿1x2 (1) ￿2x2 (2) ￿1x2 (1)
3 - ￿2x3 (2) ￿2￿2x3 (2) ￿1￿1x3 (1) ￿1￿1x3 (1)
4 - - - ￿2￿2x4 (2) ￿2￿2x4 (2)
Figure 1 below illustrates search engine results for the case in which both ￿rms have sponsored
links and ￿rm 2 is awarded the ￿rst sponsored link. In this case, the overall CTR for ￿rm 1
is ￿1x2 + ￿1￿1x3 and for ￿rm 2 is ￿2x1 + ￿2￿2x4:
3We make no assumption about the relationship between ￿i and ￿i: If ￿rms employ e⁄ective targeted
marketing with speci￿c phrases included in the sponsored link, then it is likely that ￿i > ￿i: However, if
consumers have a distaste for sponsored links, then it is possible that ￿i < ￿i:
5Figure 1: Example of search engine results when ￿rm 2 is awarded the ￿rst sponsored link
2.2 Firm pro￿t
Firms are interested in maximizing pro￿t generated by the search channel. Let pi;k denote
the cost-per-click (CPC) paid by ￿rm i when ￿rm i sponsors a link in position k: Firms only
incur the CPC if a customer reaches the ￿rm through its sponsored link. Let ￿rs
i denote
the pro￿t of ￿rm i when, at most, one of the ￿rms sponsors a link, ￿rm 1 adopts a strategy
r; ￿rm 2 adopts a strategy s; and r;s 2 fA;Ng, where A is a strategy of advertising a
sponsored link and N is a strategy of not advertising. Finally, let ￿AAk
i denote the pro￿t for
￿rm i when both ￿rms have sponsored links and ￿rm i￿ s sponsored link appears in position
k: The expected value to ￿rm i of a customer who clicks on a link to ￿rm i is vi:4
Expected pro￿ts for each ￿rm under each possible strategy pro￿le can be determined
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4This expected value is the product of the conversion rate (the probability the consumer makes a purchase
after clicking on the sponsored link) and the average purchase amount. We make no assumptions on the
ordering of v1 and v2: Firm 2 is assumed less relevant (￿2 < ￿1); but it may provide a more valuable product
(v2 > v1):






2 = ￿2x1 (v2 ￿ p2;1) + ￿2x3￿2v2:
If both ￿rms advertise, then each ￿rm￿ s pro￿t depends upon the placement of its sponsored
listing. If ￿rm 1 is listed ￿rst, then
￿
AA1
1 = ￿1x1 (v1 ￿ p1;1) + ￿1x3￿1v1
￿
AA2
2 = ￿2x2 (v2 ￿ p2;2) + ￿2x4￿2v2:
If ￿rm 2 is listed ￿rst when both ￿rms advertise, then
￿
AA2
1 = ￿1x2 (v1 ￿ p1;2) + ￿1x3￿1v1
￿
AA1
2 = ￿2x1 (v2 ￿ p2;1) + ￿2x4￿2v2:
3 The Keyword Auction
Consider a position auction of the form analyzed by Edelman et. al. (2007) and Varian
(2007) in which ￿rms also have the option of not bidding and relying only on organic links
to access customers, and the search engine establishes a minimum CPC of c > 0:5 Each ￿rm
can submit a bid bi which represents the maximum CPC that ￿rm i can be assessed for a
sponsored link (in either position 1 or position 2). We restrict attention to a generalized
second price auction in which the CPC pi;k paid by ￿rm i for a sponsored link in position k
is not a function of the bid submitted by ￿rm i: Furthermore, we assume ￿rm i pays a CPC
of c for its sponsored link if i is the only ￿rm with a sponsored link or if both ￿rms have
sponsored links and i is listed second.
3.1 Optimal bidding strategies
The pro￿t functions for each ￿rm determine ￿rm strategies for the game in which the ￿rms
simultaneously choose advertising strategies and bids. There will be an equilibrium in which
5Google previously imposed a uniform minimum CPC of $.05. Currently, Google￿ s minimum CPC can
vary across keywords and ￿rms.
7neither ￿rm chooses to advertise if ￿NN
1 > ￿AN
1 ; and ￿NN
2 > ￿NA
2 : Noting that pi;1 = c if only
one ￿rm advertises, these restrictions require
￿1x1v1 ￿ ￿1x1 (v1 ￿ c) + ￿1x2￿1v1; and
￿2x2v2 ￿ ￿2x1 (v2 ￿ c) + ￿2x3￿2v2
which imply that ￿rm 1 will prefer not to advertise conditional on ￿rm 2 not advertising if
c ￿ v1 (1 ￿ ￿1=￿1 + ￿1￿1x2=￿1x1) ￿ c1; and ￿rm 2 will prefer not to advertise conditional on
￿rm 1 not advertising if c ￿ v2 (1 ￿ ￿2x2=￿2x1 + ￿2￿2x3=￿2x1) ￿ c2.
Proposition 1 If c > maxfc1;c2g; then there is an equilibrium in which neither ￿rm bids
on a sponsored link.
If c < maxfc1;c2g; then at least one ￿rm will advertise with strictly positive probability.
In addition, while a high minimum CPC of c > maxfc1;c2g ensures existence of an equilib-
rium in which neither ￿rm chooses to sponsor a link, as shown in Section 4 below, it does
not rule out the possibility of an equilibrium in which both ￿rms sponsor a link.
To determine optimal strategies for each ￿rm when at least one ￿rm bids on a sponsored
link, we begin by assuming that one ￿rm j de￿nitely bids on a sponsored link. Three
conditions determine the optimal response by ￿rm i: Conditions 1.1 and 2.1 correspond
directly to the upper bound envy-free equilibrium bidding condition in Edelman et. al.
and Varian for the case of two ￿rms with c > 0: As Varian (2007 p. 1168) argues, this
upper bound is a more compelling determinant of bidding behavior, so our analysis focuses
on equilibrium behavior in which bids and the decision of whether or not to bid are based
on the upper bound of possible equilibrium bids. The second and third conditions are no-
regret conditions which ensure that advertising is preferred to the alternative of encountering
customers through the organic channel alone.
￿ Condition 1.1. Firm 1 prefers to advertise and be listed ￿rst over advertising and being
listed second (given ￿rm 2 does advertise) if ￿AA1
1 > ￿AA2
1 which implies
￿1x1 (v1 ￿ p1;1) + ￿1x3￿1v1 > ￿1x2 (v1 ￿ c) + ￿1x3￿1v1
or
p1;1 < v1 (1 ￿ x2=x1) + cx2=x1 ￿ ~ p1:
Note that ~ p1 is increasing in c; and ~ p1 < v1 if and only if c < v1:
8￿ Condition 1.2. Firm 1 prefers to advertise and be listed ￿rst over not advertising given
￿rm 2 does advertise if ￿AA1
1 > ￿NA
1 which implies
￿1x1 (v1 ￿ p1;1) + ￿1x3￿1v1 > ￿1x2v1
or
p1;1 < v1 (1 ￿ ￿1x2=￿1x1 + ￿1￿1x3=￿1x1) ￿ ^ p1:
Note that ^ p1 ￿ v1 if and only if ￿1 ￿ x2=x3:
￿ Condition 1.3. Firm 1 prefers to advertise and be listed second over not advertising
given ￿rm 2 advertises if ￿AA2
1 > ￿NA
1 which implies
￿1x2 (v1 ￿ c) + ￿1x3￿1v1 > ￿1x2v1
or
c < v1 (1 ￿ ￿1=￿1 + ￿1￿1x3=￿1x2) ￿ ~ c1:
Note that ~ p1 = ^ p1 when c = ~ c1: If c > ~ c1; then ~ p1 > ^ p1; and if c < ~ c1; then ~ p1 < ^ p1: In
addition, ~ c1 ￿ v1 if and only if ￿1 ￿ x2=x3:
One implication of the above conditions is that with su¢ ciently strong complementarities
(￿1 > x2=x3); ￿rm 1 is willing to incur a CPC exceeding v1 to sponsor a link provided ￿rm
2 also sponsors a link.6
Similar conditions also apply to ￿rm 2.
￿ Condition 2.1. Firm 2 prefers to advertise and be listed ￿rst over advertising and being
listed second (given ￿rm 1 advertises) if ￿AA1
2 > ￿AA2
2 which implies
￿2x1 (v2 ￿ p2;1) + ￿2x4￿2v2 > ￿2x2 (v2 ￿ c) + ￿2x4￿2v2
or
p2;1 < v2 (1 ￿ x2=x1) + cx2=x1 = ~ p2:
Note ~ p2 is increasing in c and that ~ p2 < v2 if and only if c < v2:
6Because ￿1 > x2=x3 implies ~ c1 > v1; condition 1.3 implies ￿rm 1 will pay a CPC up to ~ c1 > v1 for a
sponsored link in the second position. Furthermore, conditions 1.1 and 1.2 imply that if ~ c1 > c > v1; then
^ p1 > ~ p1 > v1 and ￿rm 1 is willing to pay a CPC of ~ p1 > v1 for the ￿rst sponsored link. If c > ~ c1 > v1; then
~ p1 > ^ p1 > v1 and ￿rm 1 is willing to pay a CPC of ^ p1 > v1 to sponsor a link in the ￿rst position but is not
willing to sponsor a link in the second position.
9￿ Condition 2.2. Firm 2 prefers to advertise and be listed ￿rst over not advertising given
￿rm 1 advertises if ￿AA1
2 > ￿AN
2 which implies
￿2x1 (v2 ￿ p2;1) + ￿2x4￿2v2 > ￿2x3v2
or
p2;1 < v2 (1 ￿ ￿2x3=￿2x1 + ￿2￿2x4=￿2x1) ￿ ^ p2:
Note that ^ p2 ￿ v2 if and only if ￿2 ￿ x3=x4:
￿ Condition 2.3. Firm 2 prefers to advertise and be listed second over not advertising
given ￿rm 1 advertises if ￿AA2
2 > ￿AN
2 which implies
￿2x2 (v2 ￿ c) + ￿2x4￿2v2 > ￿2x3v2
or
c < v2 (1 ￿ ￿2x3=￿2x2 + ￿2￿2x4=￿2x2) ￿ ~ c2:
Note that ~ p2 > ^ p2 if and only if c > ~ c2 and that ~ c2 ￿ v2 if and only if ￿2 ￿ x3=x4: As
was true for ￿rm 1, if there are strong complementarities between ￿rm 2s sponsored
and organic links so that ￿2 > x3=x4; then conditional on ￿rm 1 advertising, ￿rm 2 is
willing to sponsor a link at a CPC exceeding v2:
The above conditions enable us to specify the optimal bidding behavior of a given ￿rm i
given both ￿rms bid on sponsored links. Because we assume the search engine holds a second
price auction in which the CPC for the sponsored link in the ￿rst position is not a function
of the bid submitted by the ￿rm awarded this position, and the CPC for the sponsored link
in the second position is c; standard arguments imply that bidding the maximum willingness
to pay per click (e:g:; ~ pi; or ^ pi); depending upon which of the conditions above applies, is a
weakly dominant strategy.
Assuming that the opposing ￿rm j bids on a sponsored link, the optimal strategy of
￿rm i can be depicted as a function of c and depends on the degree to which a sponsored
link substitutes for or complements the ￿rm￿ s organic link. First suppose ￿i < xi+1=xi+2
(sponsored and organic links are substitutes or weak complements): In this case ~ ci < ^ pi < vi
and three ranges for c are possible. First, if c ￿ ~ ci; then ^ pi ￿ ~ pi and ￿rm i bids ~ pi: Conditions
i:1 and i:2 imply that the ￿rm prefers to win a sponsored link in the ￿rst position at any
10Figure 2: Optimal bids when ￿i < xi+1=xi+2
CPC up to ~ pi, and also is willing to sponsor a link in the second position at a CPC of c.
Therefore, the ￿rm should bid ~ pi. Second, if ~ ci ￿ c ￿ ^ pi; then ~ pi ￿ ^ pi and conditions i:1 and
i:2 imply that ￿rm i is willing to pay a CPC of ^ pi to sponsor a link in the ￿rst position,
but condition i:3 implies that ￿rm i is not willing to sponsor a link in the second position.
Therefore, for ~ ci ￿ c ￿ ^ pi; ￿rm i should bid ^ pi if and only if this bid will win the auction.
Finally, if c > ^ pi; then ￿rm i is not willing to sponsor a link in either position. The optimal
bid for ￿rm i given ￿i < xi+1=xi+2 and ￿rm j sponsors a link is depicted in ￿gure 2. The
dashed section of the bid function for values of c 2 (~ ci; ^ pi] indicates that for values of c in
this range ￿rm i is only willing to bid ^ pi if it is certain to win the ￿rst position.
The optimal strategy for ￿rm i when ￿i > xi+1=xi+2 (sponsored and organic links are
strong complements) is depicted in ￿gure 3. In this case vi < ^ pi < ~ ci. Furthermore,
c > ~ pi > vi for c ￿ vi; and ~ pi ￿ ^ pi for c ￿ ~ ci: Assuming that ￿rm j bids on a sponsored
link, four ranges of c must be considered. First, if c ￿ vi, then ￿rm i bids ~ pi. Second, if
^ pi ￿ c > vi; then c > ~ pi; so ￿rm i prefers to be listed second instead of ￿rst and should bid
c: However, if both ￿rms submit a bid of c; then ￿rm i may be randomly awarded the ￿rst
sponsored link. This is acceptable as long as c ￿ ^ pi (condition i:2 implies ￿rm i prefers to
11Figure 3: Optimal bids when ￿i > xi+1=xi+2
be listed ￿rst over not advertising as long as pi;1 < ^ pi): Thus, for ^ pi ￿ c > vi; ￿rm i will
submit a bid of c: Because c > vi; the bene￿t of the sponsored link accrues only through
the complement e⁄ect of increasing clicks on the organic link. The ￿rm prefers the second
sponsored link position in order to realize the complementarity while minimizing the number
of clicks on the sponsored link. However, ￿rm i is still better o⁄ sponsoring a link in the
￿rst position than not sponsoring as long as c ￿ ^ pi:
Third, if ~ ci ￿ c > ^ pi; then ￿rm i is only willing to sponsor a link if it is in the second
sponsored position with a CPC of c: In ￿gure 3 the dashed bid function for values of c
satisfying ~ ci ￿ c > ^ pi indicates that ￿rm i is only willing to bid for values of c in this range
if its sponsored link is guaranteed to appear in the second position. Finally, if c > ~ ci; then
￿rm i is always better o⁄ not sponsoring a link given ￿rm j does sponsor.
The discussion of optimal bidding strategies for ￿rm i in the previous paragraphs is
summarized in Lemmas 2 and 3. Note that these results assume that the competing ￿rm j
sponsors a link. If ￿rm j does not sponsor a link, then ￿rm i will sponsor a link if and only
if c < ci: In section 4 we consider conditions under which ￿rms choose to bid on sponsored
links or rely only on organic links in equilibrium.
12Lemma 2 Assume ￿i ￿ xi+1=xi+2 and that ￿rm j participates in the auction for sponsored
links. If c ￿ ~ ci; then ￿rm i bids ~ pi: If ^ pi ￿ c > ~ ci; then ￿rm i participates and bids ^ pi if and
only if ￿rm i will secure the ￿rst position in the sponsored links with a bid of ^ pi: If c > ^ pi;
then ￿rm i will not sponsor a link.
Lemma 3 Assume ￿i > xi+1=xi+2 and that ￿rm j participates in the auction for sponsored
links. If c ￿ vi; then ￿rm i bids ~ pi: If vi < c ￿ ^ pi, then ￿rm i bids c: If ^ pi < c ￿ ~ ci, then ￿rm
i participates and bids c if and only if ￿rm i will secure the second position in the sponsored
links with a bid of c: If c > ~ ci; then ￿rm i will not sponsor a link.
Note that min(~ pi; ^ pi) = ~ pi if c ￿ ~ ci; and min(~ pi; ^ pi) = ^ pi if c > ~ ci: Thus, lemmas 2 and 3
imply the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If c > maxf^ pi; ^ pjg; then there is no equilibrium in which both ￿rms bid on
sponsored links.
The above analysis provides insight into how the presence of organic links impacts bids
placed on sponsored links. In the absence of organic links, ￿i = 0; and the upper bound
equilibrium bid for each ￿rm is de￿ned by b￿
i = ~ pi.7 From lemma 2 it follows that if organic
and sponsored links are substitutes or su¢ ciently weak complements, and c is su¢ ciently
small for both ￿rms (c ￿ ~ ci); then the presence of organic links has no impact on equilibrium
bids. Both ￿rms bid ~ pi; which is independent of ￿i and ￿i; so bids do not decrease as the
relevance ￿i of the organic link increases or increase as the relevance ￿i of sponsored links
increases. However, because ^ pi is decreasing in ￿i when ￿i < xi+1=xi+2; if the relevance of













which is equivalent to c > ~ ci), then the presence of organic links alters equilibrium bidding
behavior. In this case, assuming ￿rm i chooses to bid, ￿rm i bids ^ pi which is less than ~ pi;
and the equilibrium bid of ￿rm i is decreasing in ￿i and increasing in ￿i: In addition, because
the maximum cpc ~ ci that ￿rm i is willing to pay for a sponsored link in the second position
is decreasing in ￿i (increasing in ￿i), as the relevance of organic links increases (relevance of
the sponsored links decreases), the SE must lower the minimum cpc in order to induce both
￿rms to participate in the keyword auction.
7The value ^ pi for each ￿rm is equivalent to the upper bound established in equation (10) in Varian.
13The impact of organic links on the upper bound of the equilibrium bids is reversed if
organic and sponsored links are su¢ ciently strong complements and c > vi. As per lemma
3, assuming ￿i > xi+1=xi+2 and that ￿rm j bids on sponsored links, if c ￿ vi; then ￿rm i
bids ~ pi which is equivalent to the bid ￿rm i would submit in the absence of organic links. If
c > vi; then ￿rm i is willing to bid more than ~ pi provided c < ^ pi: Furthermore, the maximum
cpc that the SE can extract is ^ pi which is increasing in ￿i and decreasing in ￿i: For c > ^ pi;
￿rm i will only participate in the auction if c ￿ ~ ci and ￿rm i wins the second sponsored
position, but the maximum cpc ~ ci that ￿rm i is willing to pay for the second position still is
increasing in ￿i and decreasing in ￿i:
The previous two paragraphs consider the impact of organic links assuming both ￿rms
bid on sponsored links. However, it is possible that only one ￿rm will choose to bid on a
sponsored link. The maximum cpc that a given ￿rm i is willing to pay for a sponsored link
when ￿rm i is the only ￿rm sponsoring a link is ci:8 The impact of organic links on ci depends
upon how ￿i compares to xi=xi+1 (as opposed to xi+1=xi+2 when both ￿rms bid on sponsored
links). Intuitively, when only ￿rm i bids on a sponsored link, the location e⁄ect moves ￿rm
i￿ s organic link from position i to i + 1; while, if ￿rm j is sponsoring a link, a decision to
sponsor by ￿rm i will move ￿rm i￿ s organic link from position i + 1 to i + 2: If organic and
sponsored links are substitutes or weak complements (so ￿i < min(xi=xi+1;xi+1=xi+2); then
(provided ￿rm i is not bidding ~ pi) an increase in ￿i reduces the amount ￿rm i is willing to
pay for a sponsored link. Similarly, if ￿i > max(xi=xi+1;xi+1=xi+2); then an increase in ￿i
increases (or at least never reduces) the amount ￿rm i is willing to pay for a sponsored link.
If the complement e⁄ect of sponsored and organic links and the location speci￿c e⁄ects xk
are such that xi+1=xi+2 > ￿i > xi=xi+1; then an increase in the relevance ￿i of organic links
to ￿rm i would reduce the amount ￿rm i is willing to pay for a sponsored link if ￿rm j also
sponsors, but increase the amount ￿rm i is willing to pay if ￿rm i is the only ￿rm with a
sponsored link.
3.2 Search Engine Allocation of Sponsored Links
The search engine must determine which ￿rm to list ￿rst when both ￿rms submit bids
exceeding the reservation price c. The expected revenue to the search engine from listing
8In the absence of organic links ￿i = 0 and ci = vi:
14￿rm 1 ￿rst is
￿1x1p1;1 + ￿2x2p2;2
and from listing ￿rm 2 ￿rst is
￿2x1p2;1 + ￿1x2p1;2:
The price paid by any ￿rm cannot exceed that ￿rm￿ s bid, so pi;k ￿ bi; and the CPC for the
￿rm listed second is pi;2 = c for i = 1;2. Thus, assuming that the search engine maximizes
its revenues, it will list ￿rm 1 ￿rst if









and will list ￿rm 2 ￿rst otherwise. While equation (1) determines the optimal position
assignments based on bids submitted, it does not provide a general rule for determining the
price paid by the ￿rm listed in the ￿rst sponsored link position. Assuming it is optimal
for the search engine to award ￿rm 1 the ￿rst sponsored link, any price p1;1 satisfying




￿1x1 would be possible. However, because we are considering a













; we assume the auction rule establishes a price pi;1 for the ￿rst
sponsored link position that is just su¢ cient to ensure positions are awarded based on the
condition (1).9 In particular, if bids are such that equation (1) is satis￿ed, then ￿rm 1 is











where the inequality follows from the assumptions that b2 > c; x1 ￿ x2; and that the ￿rm in
the second sponsored position pays a CPC of c: If bids are such that equation (1) is violated,








9Establishing a lower minimum price would clearly not maximize search engine expected revenue. Estab-
lishing a higher minimum price would create incentives for advertisers to repeatedly lower their bids in an
attempt to learn the lowest price the search engine would accept. As Edelman et. al. note, similar behavior
under ￿rst-price auction rules in early sponsored search markets was a signi￿cant reason for the transition
to the use of a generalized second price auction.
15Because b1 > c by assumption, ￿rm 2 incurs a CPC greater than c if it is awarded the ￿rst
sponsored link position. Given the assumptions that ￿1 > ￿2 and x1 ￿ x2; ￿rm 1 may be
listed ￿rst even if it bids less than ￿rm 2, and ￿rm 2 must bid strictly more than ￿rm 1
in order to be listed ￿rst. Note that if c = 0; then a rule of ranking ￿rms by their quality
adjusted bids ￿ibi is optimal and the second price auction rule charges the ￿rm i listed
￿rst a CPC equal to the quality adjusted bid bj￿i=￿j of the ￿rm listed second.10 However,
casual observations from Google searches indicate that for many keywords some sponsored
link positions often go unsold, so understanding the implications of a binding minimum
cost-per-click, c > 0 is important.
The premium (p2;1 ￿ b1) that ￿rm 2 must pay in order to be listed ￿rst is increasing in
￿1 (the relevance of the sponsored link to ￿rm 1), and decreasing in ￿2 (the relevance of
the sponsored link to ￿rm 2): Similarly, the discount (b2 ￿ p1;1) for ￿rm 1 is decreasing in
￿1 and increasing in ￿2: In the limiting case in which ￿1 ! ￿2; so that ￿rms are equally
relevant to consumers who utilize sponsored links, the search engine will simply rank the
￿rms according to their bids, and the ￿rm submitting the highest bid pays a CPC equal to
the second highest bid.
The premium paid by ￿rm 2 and the discount to ￿rm 1 are both decreasing in the ratio
x2=x1: As this ratio increases, the incremental gain in the click-through-rate from being in
the ￿rst as opposed to the second sponsored position decreases. This lessens the search
engine incentive to provide a discount to ￿rm 1 and lessens its ability to extract a premium
from ￿rm 2 for the ￿rst sponsored position. Similar logic explains why both the premium to
￿rm 2 and discount to ￿rm 1 are decreasing in c:










Note that if both ￿rms submit bids (by assumption, these bids will be at least as large as
the minimum CPC of c), then the search engine will award the ￿rst sponsored position to
10It is easily shown that such an ordering rule generalizes to the case of N bidders with K sponsored link
positions provided either c = 0; or c > 0 and N > K and ￿g(K+1)bg(K+1) > ￿g(K)c; where g(k) is the identity
of the ￿rm awarded a sponsored link in position k < K and g (K + 1) is the identity of the highest ranked
￿rm not awarded a sponsored link. (In this case the ￿rm awarded the last sponsored link position pays
a CPC of ￿g(K+1)bg(K+1)=￿g(K) > c:) However, if the ￿rm awarded the last sponsored link position pays
c; either because N < K or because N > K and ￿g(K+1)bg(K+1) < ￿g(K)c; then the search engine should
award higher sponsored link positions based on quality adjusted bids plus a premium (or discount if the less
relevant ￿rm is ranked ￿rst) which depends upon the minimum CPC; c.
16the ￿rm i for which bi > hi (bj): The ￿rm i that is awarded the ￿rst sponsored position will
be charged a CPC of maxfhi (bj);cg; and the ￿rm that is awarded the second sponsored
position will be charged a CPC of c: For simplicity, we assume that if the search engine is
indi⁄erent between which ￿rm to list ￿rst, then the ￿rst sponsored position is awarded to
the more relevant ￿rm 1.
4 Equilibrium Participation and Bidding Outcomes
We now present equilibrium results for the case in which sponsored links substitute for or
weakly complement organic links, so ￿i ￿ xi+1=xi+2 for i = 1;2 and for the case in which
sponsored links strongly complement organic links so ￿i > xi+1=xi+2: The analysis of the case
in which ￿i ￿ xi+1=xi+2 for one ￿rm i while ￿j > xj+1=xj+2 is similar and is discussed brie￿ y
in the appendix. For all ranges of ￿i and ￿j the equilibria fall into one of four categories;
both ￿rms bid on sponsored links with probability 1; one ￿rm bids and the other does not;
neither ￿rm bids on sponsored links; the ￿rms adopt mixed strategies in which the decision
of whether or not to bid is determined randomly. The mixed strategy equilibria arise if
market parameters are such that it is optimal for one ￿rm i to bid on a sponsored link if and
only if ￿rm j does not bid, and it is optimal for ￿rm j to bid if and only if ￿rm i does bid.
Propositions 5 through 8 below brie￿ y summarize the equilibrium results.11 A more detailed
presentation of equilibrium results and the derivation of equilibrium mixed strategies are
provided in the appendix.
Proposition 5 Suppose ￿i ￿ xi+1=xi+2 for i = 1;2:
1. If c ￿ min(~ c1;~ c2;max(c1;c2)); then there is a unique equilibrium in which each ￿rm
submits a bid of ~ pi for sponsored links.
2. If max(c1;c2) < c < min(~ c1;~ c2); then there are two pure strategy equilibria; in one
equilibrium, neither ￿rm bids on sponsored links, and in the other equilibrium each ￿rm
submits a bid of ~ pi:
11Note that propositions 5 and 6 do not provide a comprehensive treatment of all possible equilibrium
outcomes. Because of the large number of possible parameter combinations, we have presented a subset
of equilibrium results that summarize all the types of possible outcomes. Characterization of equilibria for
other possible ordering of the model parameters can be similarly derived using the approach presented here.
173. Suppose max(ci; ^ pi) < c for one ￿rm i: If c < cj; then there is a unique equilibrium in
which only ￿rm j sponsors a link. If c > cj; then neither ￿rm sponsors a link.
4. Suppose max(ci;~ ci) < c < ^ pi; and c < ~ cj: If ^ pi > hi (~ pj); then there is a unique
equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids ^ pi; ￿rm j bids ~ pj, and ￿rm i is awarded the ￿rst
sponsored link. If ^ pi < hi (~ pj) and c < cj; then there is an equilibrium in which ￿rm j
bids ~ pj and ￿rm i does not bid, and if ^ pi < hi (~ pj) and c > cj; then neither ￿rm bids
on sponsored links.
5. Suppose ci < c < ~ ci; and ~ cj < c < cj: If ^ pj > maxfhj (~ pi);cg; then there is a unique
equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids ~ pi; ￿rm j bids ^ pj; and ￿rm j is awarded the ￿rst
sponsored link. If ^ pj < maxfhj (~ pi);cg; then there is a mixed strategy equilibrium as
described in the appendix.
6. If c > max(c1;c2) and c > min(~ c1;~ c2) then neither ￿rm bids on sponsored links.
Proof. The ￿rst, third, fourth and sixth results follow directly from comparison of ￿rm
pro￿t from advertising versus not advertising for c in the speci￿ed range. The second result
follows from Proposition 1 if c > max(c1;c2); and from lemma 2 and the fact that if ￿rm
j advertises, then cases i:1; i:2; and i:3 imply that ￿rm i should advertise and bid ~ pi if
c < min(~ c1;~ c2): For the ￿fth result note that c in the speci￿ed range implies c < ~ pi < ^ pi
and c < ~ ci; so conditions i:1; i:2; and i:3 imply ￿rm i will bid ~ pi if ￿rm j bids. Furthermore,
c > ~ cj implies ^ pj < ~ pj; so ￿rm j will only advertise if it wins the ￿rst sponsored link at a
CPC up to ^ pj: Now consider the case of c ￿ ^ pj and ^ pj >
￿i
￿j ~ pi +
x2c(￿j￿￿i)
￿jx1 : Because ￿rm j
will be listed ￿rst with a bid of ^ pj; there is an equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids ~ pi and ￿rm
j bids ^ pj. Furthermore, because it is optimal for each ￿rm to bid if the other ￿rm bids, and
c < cj implies ￿rm ￿rm j will bid if ￿rm i does not, this equilibrium is unique. Proofs for
mixed strategy results are presented in the appendix. ￿
Statements 1, 3, 4, and 6 in the above proposition generate straightforward equilibrium
outcomes. Not surprisingly, the minimum CPC must be su¢ ciently low to induce both ￿rms
to submit bids, and if c is too large, then neither ￿rm will participate in the auction. Under
the conditions of statement 2 ￿rms engage in a coordination game in which equilibrium
entails matching the strategy adopted by the competing ￿rm. Statement 5 illustrates that a
mixed strategy equilibrium can exist. An interesting outcome occurs if cj > c > ^ pj: In this
18case ￿rm j will bid in the keyword auction despite the fact that the minimum CPC exceeds
the highest amount, ^ pj; that ￿rm j is willing to pay for the ￿rst sponsored position when
both ￿rms sponsor links. Firm j is willing to submit such a high bid because of the fact
that ￿rm i may choose not to bid and if ￿rm i does not bid, then ￿rm j is willing to incur a
CPC up to cj to sponsored a link.
Proposition 6 presents similar results for the case in which organic and sponsored links
are complements.
Proposition 6 Suppose ￿i > xi+1=xi+2 for i = 1;2:
1. If c ￿ min(^ p1; ^ p2;max(c1;c2)); then there is a unique equilibrium in which each ￿rm
submits a bid of maxf~ pi;cg for sponsored links.
2. If max(c1;c2) < c < min(^ p1; ^ p2); then there are two pure strategy equilibria; in one
equilibrium, neither ￿rm bids on sponsored links, and in the other equilibrium each ￿rm
submits a bid of maxf~ pi;cg:
3. If max(ci;~ ci) < c < cj for some i and j; then there is a unique equilibrium in which
only ￿rm j sponsors a link.
4. Suppose max(ci; ^ pi) < c < ~ ci and c < ^ pj: If c < hi (maxf~ pj;cg); then there is a unique
equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids c; ￿rm j bids maxf~ pj;cg; and ￿rm j is awarded the
￿rst sponsored link. If c > hi (maxf~ pj;cg) and c < cj; then there is an equilibrium in
which ￿rm j bids maxf~ pj;cg and ￿rm i does not bid, and if c > hi (maxf~ pj;cg) and
c > cj; then neither ￿rm bids on sponsored links.
5. Suppose ^ pi < c < minfci;~ cig and max(cj; ^ pj) < c < ~ cj: If c < hi (c); then there is a
unique equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids c; and ￿rm j does not bid. If c > hi (c); then
there is a mixed strategy equilibrium as presented in the appendix.
6. Suppose ci < c < ^ pi and ^ pj < c < cj: If c < ~ cj and c < hj (maxf~ pi;cg); then there is a
unique equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids maxf~ pi;cg; ￿rm j bids c; and ￿rm i is awarded
the ￿rst sponsored link. Otherwise, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium as presented
in the appendix.
7. If c > max(c1;c2) and c > min(^ p1; ^ p2) then neither ￿rm bids on sponsored links.
19Proof. The ￿rst, third, fourth and seventh results follow directly from comparison of
￿rm pro￿t from advertising versus not advertising for c in the speci￿ed range. The second
result follows from Proposition 1 if c > max(c1;c2); and from lemma 2 and the fact that if
￿rm j advertises, then cases i:1; i:2; and i:3 imply that ￿rm i should advertise and bid ~ pi if
c < min(~ c1;~ c2): For the ￿fth result note that c in the speci￿ed range implies c > ^ pi > ~ pi and
c < ~ ci so conditions i:1; i:2; and i:3 imply that if ￿rm j bids, then ￿rm i will bid c only if it
will be awarded the second sponsored link, and because c > cj and ^ pj < c < ~ cj; ￿rm j will
bid only if ￿rm i also bids and ￿rm j wins the second sponsored position. Thus, if c < hi (c);
so ￿rm i loses the auction and is awarded the second sponsored position when both ￿rms
bid, ￿rm j will never bid. However, if c > hi(c); so ￿rm j would lose the auction, then there
is no pure strategy equilibrium because it is optimal for ￿rm i to bid only if ￿rm j does not,
and it is optimal for ￿rm j to bid if ￿rm i does. For the sixth result, because ci < c < ^ pi;
it is optimal for ￿rm i to bid if ￿rm j bids, regardless of the sponsored position it wins, but
it is not optimal for ￿rm i to bid if ￿rm j does not. Similarly, because c < cj; it is always
optimal for ￿rm j to bid if ￿rm i does not, but because c > ^ pj; it is only optimal for ￿rm j
to bid when ￿rm i also bids if c < ~ cj and ￿rm j wins the second sponsored position. Thus
if c < ~ cj and c < hj (maxf~ pi;cg); so ￿rm j wins the second sponsored position when both
￿rms bid, then there is a unique equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids maxf~ pi;cg; ￿rm j bids c:
Otherwise, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium as presented in the appendix. ￿
The following two propositions demonstrate the important role that ￿i, the degree of com-
plementarity or substitutability between sponsored and organic links, plays in determining
whether ￿rms participate in the keyword auction.
Proposition 7 If ￿i < (￿ixi ￿ ￿ix1)=￿ixi+1 for i = 1;2; then for any c ￿ 0 there is an
equilibrium in which neither ￿rm bids on sponsored links.
Proof. This follows from part 2 of proposition 5 and the fact that c1 < 0 and c2 < 0
given the values of ￿1; ￿2; ￿1; and ￿2 in the statement of the proposition. ￿
Note that because ￿i > 0; the conditions of proposition 7 require ￿1 < ￿1 and ￿2 <
￿2x2=x1: These conditions imply that consumers are averse to sponsored links ￿they are
more likely to click on the organic link to ￿rm i when presented with both a sponsored and
an organic link to the ￿rm. Thus, proposition 7 implies that if consumers are su¢ ciently
20averse to sponsored links and sponsored links are not strong complements to organic links,
then ￿rms may choose not to participate in keyword auctions even if the search engine o⁄ers
to provide sponsored links at no cost to the advertising ￿rm. Note that this result can apply
even if sponsored links are strict complements to organic links so that ￿i > 1: 12
Under the conditions of Proposition 7, an equilibrium in which neither ￿rm bids on
sponsored links exists for any c ￿ 0; but this equilibrium may not be unique. In particular,
it is possible that ~ c1 > 0 and ~ c2 > 0, and a second equilibrium in which both ￿rms participate
in the auction with bids of ~ pi exists if c < minf~ c1;~ c2g: However, if ￿1; ￿2; ￿1; and ￿2 are
all su¢ ciently small, then there is a unique equilibrium in which neither ￿rm participates in
the keyword auction for any c ￿ 0:13
Alternatively, as demonstrated in proposition 8 below, su¢ ciently strong complementar-
ities between sponsored and organic links give the search engine signi￿cant market power
regardless of the relationship between the relevance ￿i of organic links and ￿i of sponsored
links.
Proposition 8 If ￿i > xi+1=xi+2 for i = 1;2; then for any c ￿ minf^ p1; ^ p2g there is an equi-
librium in which both ￿rms participate in the keyword auction and submit bids of maxf~ pi;cg:
In addition, if ￿i > (xi ￿ xi+1)=(xi+1 ￿ xi+2) ￿ ￿ ￿i for i = 1;2; then the equilibrium is
unique.
Proof. This follows directly from lemmas 2 and 3 and the fact that ci > ^ pi if ￿i > ￿ ￿i;so
that c ￿ minf^ p1; ^ p2g implies c < ci and part 1 of proposition 6 applies.
Proposition 8 implies that if complementarities between sponsored and organic links are
su¢ ciently strong for both ￿rms, then the search engine can extract all of the surplus directly
generated by the sponsored link from the ￿rm with the lower expected value vi of a click-
through by setting c = vi. In fact, because both ￿rms participate in the auction for any
c ￿ minf^ p1; ^ p2g and because ￿i > xi+1=xi+2 implies ^ pi > vi; the search engine can extract
12For example, if ￿1 < ￿1 (x1 ￿ x2)=x1; then (￿1 ￿ ￿1)x1=￿1x2 > 1; so c1 < 0 will hold for some
￿1 > 1: More generally, for any c ￿ 0; c1 < c and c2 < c will both hold, so there is an equilibrium
in which neither ￿rm participates in the keyword auction, if ￿1 < (￿1x1 + ￿1x1 (c ￿ v1)=v1)=￿1x2 and
￿2 < (￿2x2 + ￿2x1 (c ￿ v2)=v2)=￿2x3:
13In particular, max(c1;~ c1;c2;~ c2) < 0 is a su¢ cient condition for a unique equilibrium in which nei-
ther ￿rm participates for any c ￿ 0: If ￿1 < ￿1 and ￿1 < minf(￿1 ￿ ￿1)x2=￿1x3;(￿1 ￿ ￿1)x1=￿1x2g:
then both c1 < 0 and ~ c1 < 0: Similarly, if ￿2 < minf￿2x2=x1;￿2x3=x2g and ￿2 <
minf(￿2x2 ￿ ￿2x1)=￿2x3;(￿2x3 ￿ ￿2x2)=￿2x4g; then both c2 < 0 and ~ c2 < 0:
21a premium in excess of vi: This result holds even if the probability ￿ixk that a consumer
clicks on the sponsored link to ￿rm i in position k is very small. Proposition 8 indicates that
when there are su¢ ciently strong complementarities between sponsored and organic links,
the driving force in a ￿rm￿ s decision to participate in a keyword auction is not the net pro￿t
generated by clicks on the sponsored link, but rather the increased tra¢ c that the sponsored
link generates through the ￿rm￿ s organic link for which the ￿rm pays nothing to the search
engine. The positive externality accrued through the complementarity justi￿es purchase of
a sponsored link even at a CPC of c > vi: Furthermore, because this result depends only
on the extent of the complementarity ￿i and the ratio xk=xk+1 of the position speci￿c click-
through rates of adjacent search listings, even a small complementarity (￿i greater than
but close to 1) can convey substantial market power to the search engine if the di⁄erence
in click-through-rates for adjacent positions is small so that xk=xk+1 ￿ 1: However, under
currently utilized pricing practices the search engine￿ s ability to exert this market power is
limited to the minimum CPC c: In particular, the search engine is unable to extract rents
generated by the positive externality the sponsored link creates by increasing tra¢ c to the
organic link.14
Propositions 7 and 8 demonstrate the important role that organic links as well as the ex-
tent to which sponsored links complement or substitute for organic links play in determining
equilibrium outcomes in keyword auction markets. At one end of the spectrum, the presence
of organic links combined with consumer resistance to sponsored links (low ￿i) and crowding
out e⁄ects (low ￿i) can lead to equilibria in which ￿rms are unwilling to utilize sponsored
links even if they are available at no charge. At the other end of the spectrum, relatively
small complementarities between sponsored and organic links can induce ￿rms to participate
in a keyword auction even if the search engine establishes a minimum CPC which exceeds
the expected value vi of a customer. The roles of organic links and the parameter ￿i in
keyword auction markets are further illustrated in the following example.
14This suggests that the search engine may be able to increase pro￿ts by implementing alternative pricing
schemes such as a two part tari⁄.
225 Example
Several of the more interesting results predicted by the model can be illustrated through a
simple example. The example presented here demonstrates outcomes in which both ￿rms
bid amounts exceeding the expected value v of a click, in which the ￿rm submitting the lower
bid is listed ￿rst in the sponsored links, and in which only the less relevant ￿rm participates
in the auction. Which of these outcomes applies depends on the relevance of each ￿rm,
the extent to which organic and sponsored links are substitutes or complements, and the
minimum cost-per-click established by the search engine. The example also enables us to
explore the optimal minimum cost-per-click c for the search engine. For example, if there are
strong complementarities, the search engine should set c su¢ ciently low so that both ￿rms
participate in the auction if the di⁄erence in the position speci￿c location e⁄ects x1 and x2
is su¢ ciently small, while it maximizes pro￿t by setting c so that only ￿rm 1 participates if
the di⁄erence in these position speci￿c location e⁄ects is large.
Consider an example with ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿, v1 = v2 = v,
xk+1




￿2 ￿ ￿. The
parameter assumptions imply that the two ￿rms are identical with the exception that ￿rm 1
is more relevant than ￿rm 2 (￿1 > ￿2 by assumption). However, the relative relevance ￿i=￿i
of sponsored and organic links is identical for both ￿rms. In addition, the ratio xk+1=xk of
the location speci￿c e⁄ect of adjacent positions is constant and equal to ￿.
The parameter assumptions imply c1 = ~ c1 = v(1￿￿(1￿￿￿)) and c2 = ~ c2 = v(1￿￿￿(1￿
￿￿)): Moreover, ~ p1 = ~ p2 = v(1￿￿)+c￿, ^ p1 = v (1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)); ^ p2 = v (1 ￿ ￿2￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)),
and ^ p1 = ~ c2: Because ￿ ￿ 1 by assumption, ￿ > 1=￿ implies c1 = ~ c1 > c2 = ~ c2 > v and
^ p1 > ^ p2; and ￿ < 1=￿ implies c1 = ~ c1 < c2 = ~ c2 < v and ^ p1 < ^ p2: The parameter
assumptions rule out the possibility of mixed strategy equilibria and enable a straightforward
characterization of equilibria for ranges of the minimum CPC c:
Suppose ￿ > 1
￿ (sponsored links strongly complements organic links).
￿ If c < v, then part 1 of proposition 6 applies and both ￿rms participate with equilibrium
bids (~ pi; ~ p2):
￿ If v < c < ^ p1; then because ^ p1 > ^ p2; part 2 of proposition 6 implies that if c < ^ p2; then
there is an equilibrium in which both ￿rms bid c because c > ~ p1 = ~ p2: Furthermore,
if c satis￿es ^ p2 < c < ^ p1 = ~ c2; then both ￿rms still bid on sponsored links because
23^ p1 >
￿2
￿1 ^ p2 +
c(￿1￿￿2)
￿1 ￿ always holds. Thus, ￿rm 2 is awarded the second sponsored link
when both ￿rms bid and part 4 of proposition 6 applies.
￿ if c2 = ~ c2 < c < ~ c1 = c1; then part 3 of proposition 6 implies that only ￿rm 1 bids on
the sponsored link.
￿ if c > ~ c1 = c1; then neither ￿rm bids on a sponsored link.
Note that ￿ > 1=￿ implies that both ^ p1 and ^ p2 are greater than v; so there are equilibria
in which both ￿rms are willing to pay a cost-per-click exceeding v in order to be listed in
the sponsored links. In this case, both ￿rms bid exactly the same amount c, but the more
relevant ￿rm (￿rm 1) is always listed ￿rst.
Suppose ￿ < 1
￿:
￿ If c < c1, then part 1 of proposition 5 implies that both ￿rms bid ~ p1 = ~ p2; and ￿rm 1
wins the ￿rst sponsored position.
￿ If c > c2, then part 6 of proposition 5 implies that neither ￿rm participates in the
keyword auction.
￿ If c1 = ~ c1 < c < c2 = ~ c2, then ￿rm 2 bids ~ p2. In addition, part 4 of proposition 5
implies that ￿rm 1 will bid ^ p1 only if this bid results in ￿rm 1 being listed ￿rst in the







￿ = hi(~ p2):
Substituting expressions for ^ p1 and ~ p2 and simplifying yields
c <




￿ ￿ c: (2)
If c < ￿ c; then ￿rm 1 announces a lower bid than ￿rm 2 (^ p1 < ~ p2), but is listed ￿rst
and pays a CPC equal to
￿2
￿1v(1 ￿ ￿) + c￿. This CPC increases in the value v of the
product and in the minimum CPC set by the search engine. If condition (2) does not
hold, then ￿rm 1 does not participate in the keyword auction and ￿rm 2 bids ~ p2 and
pays a CPC of c: Recall that ￿ indicates how consumer interest in a link depreciates
for positions sequentially lower on the search engine results page. As ￿ increases,
24the four top positions are viewed as more similar (ignoring di⁄erences in ￿rm speci￿c
relevance) by consumers. As ￿ ! 0, the ￿rst position provides a kind of winner-take-all
advantage, and c1 ! v(1 ￿
￿1
￿1); c2 ! v; and condition 2 becomes v(1 ￿
￿2
￿1) > 0 which
is always satis￿ed. This implies that if the location advantage is extreme for the ￿rst
position and the minimum CPC is between c1 and c2, then both ￿rms bid on keywords
and ￿rm 1 secures the ￿rst position even though it bids less aggressively than ￿rm 2.
As ￿ ! 1; (no location advantage), c1 ! c2 and an outcome in which ￿rm 1 bids ^ p1 is
less likely. However, ￿rm 1 is more likely to participate if organic and sponsored links
are not strong substitutes and the sponsored link of ￿rm 1 is highly relevant (￿1 close
to 1). More generally if the minimum CPC increases in the interval [c1;c2], then ￿rm
1 is less likely to bid.
If ￿ < 1=￿; then the less relevant ￿rm 2 (which is always listed second in the organic links)
has a stronger incentive to participate in the keyword auction than ￿rm 1. In particular,
￿rm 2 always bids ~ p2; while ￿rm 1 only bids if c < ￿ c: Sponsored links will rebalance positions
between competing ￿rms on the search engine if c > ￿ c and either sponsored links substitute
for organic links (i:e:; ￿ is small) or if being listed in a higher sponsored link position do not
provide a signi￿cant advantage (i:e:; ￿ is small); so only ￿rm 2 sponsors a link in equilibrium.
In addition, if c < ￿ c; then the search engine will award the ￿rst sponsored position to the
￿rm submitting the lower bid in the keyword auction.
In the context of this example, we also can determine the optimal CPC established by
the search engine. If ￿ > 1
￿, then it is clearly optimal for the search engine to establish
a minimum CPC of at least ~ c2 = ^ p1 > v: At this CPC both ￿rms participate and are
charged strictly more than v for each click. Whether establishing an even higher CPC of c1
is optimal depends on whether the pro￿t ￿1x1c1 with only ￿rm 1 sponsoring a link exceeds
the pro￿t (￿1x1 + ￿2x2)~ c2 from establishing a minimum CPC su¢ ciently low so that both
￿rms sponsor links. Substituting the values of c1 and ~ c2 into the pro￿t expressions it can
be shown that if the di⁄erence ￿ in position speci￿c click-through rates is su¢ ciently high
(in particular, if ￿ ￿ ￿1x1=(￿1x1 + ￿2x2)); then it is optimal for the search engine to set
c = ~ c2 so that both ￿rms participate in the auction. However, if ￿ < ￿1x1=(￿1x1 + ￿2x2);
then a minimum CPC of c = ~ c2 is optimal if ￿ is su¢ ciently close to 1=￿; while if ￿ is
su¢ ciently large, then it is optimal for the search engine to set c = c1 so that only ￿rm
251 participates in the keyword auction. These results imply that the search engine￿ s ability
to optimally extract surplus in the keyword auction depends upon both the magnitude of
the complementarity ￿ and the location speci￿c e⁄ect ￿. If the location e⁄ect is small
(￿ is close to 1), the search engine is able to extract su¢ cient surplus from both ￿rms as
the complementarity ￿ increases, that including both ￿rms is always optimal. However, if
the location e⁄ect is large (so that ￿ < ￿1x1=(￿1x1 + ￿2x2)); then as the magnitude of the
complementarity increases, the surplus generated by the ￿rst position is substantially higher
than that generated by the second position. Because keywords are being allocated through
a second price auction, setting c = ~ c2 to induce both ￿rms to participate would generate
a price for the ￿rst sponsored position which is much lower than the surplus that position
generates. As a result, for ￿ su¢ ciently large, the search engine should set c = c1:
If ￿ < 1
￿, then as long as c ￿ c1, both ￿rms participate with bids of ~ pi; and the the
CPC paid by each ￿rm increases with c: Furthermore, for c1 < c < ￿ c the bid ~ p2 submitted
by ￿rm 2 is strictly increasing in c; so both the CPC paid by ￿rm 1; which is awarded the
￿rst sponsored link if c ￿ ￿ c; and the minimum CPC paid by ￿rm 2 are increasing in c:
This implies the search engine will never set c < ￿ c: Alternatively, the search engine could
set c = ~ c2 so that only ￿rm 2 participates. However, it can be shown that setting c = ￿ c
is always optimal if ￿ < 1=￿: Following the intuition above, if organic and sponsored links
are substitutes or only weak complements, then the search engine extracts maximal surplus
by always inducing both ￿rms to participated in the keyword auction, regardless of the
magnitude of the location e⁄ect ￿:
6 Managerial implications and concluding remarks
This paper investigates strategic behavior of ￿rms that utilize sponsored search ads to attract
customers who may reach the ￿rm through either sponsored or organic links. We develop
a model which allows for asymmetry between these ￿rms in several dimensions. Firms may
di⁄er in the relevance to consumers of both their organic and their sponsored links (i.e.,
consumers may be more likely to follow a link to one ￿rm than another or to follow an
organic versus sponsored link). Firms also may di⁄er in the expected value of a consumer
visit to their website ￿one ￿rm may o⁄er products that are more valuable to consumers
than another ￿rm even though consumers reach both ￿rms by initially searching the same
26keyword. Our model also integrates several empirically observed aspects of consumer search
behavior including the possibility that sponsored links may be substitutes or complements to
organic links, and that consumers may have either a preference for or aversion to sponsored
links which in￿ uences the probability they click on either sponsored or organic links.
Our model analyzes how the above characteristics determine each ￿rm￿ s equilibrium
bidding strategy in a sponsored search keyword auction. Our results highlight the important
role that the relationship between organic and sponsored links and the relevance of these links
to consumers plays in ￿rm bidding decisions. To the extent that these parameters can be
manipulated by bidding ￿rms or the search engine, our results have important implications
for management strategy. For example, the relevance ￿i to consumers of a ￿rm￿ s organic
link and the relevance ￿i of a ￿rm￿ s sponsored link both directly impact the ￿rm￿ s decision
to participate in the keyword auction. However, contrary to what one might anticipate, a
￿rm￿ s optimal bid for a sponsored link does not necessarily decrease as the organic link to
the ￿rm becomes more relevant to consumers (as ￿i increases). Nor does a ￿rm￿ s optimal
bid necessarily increase if consumers are more likely to click on a sponsored link to the ￿rm.
Rather these relationships depend on the extent to which sponsored and organic links are
substitutes or complements and on the minimum cost-per-click established by the search
engine. For example, if the minimum cost-per-click is su¢ ciently small and organic and
sponsored links are not strong substitutes (so the conditions of proposition 7 do not apply),
then the optimal bid ~ pi for each ￿rm is independent of the relevance to consumers of the
￿rm￿ s sponsored or organic links. The low minimum cost-per-click induces both ￿rms to
bid in equilibrium, so, although changes in ￿i and ￿i impact the ￿rm￿ s total pro￿t, neither
a⁄ects the marginal pro￿t from a change in ￿rm i￿ s sponsored link position (from ￿rst to
second or second to ￿rst). Therefore, neither change has any impact on the optimal bid.15
Furthermore, while it seems obvious that the managerial objective of increasing the rel-
evance ￿i and ￿i of a ￿rm￿ s organic and sponsored links will increase ￿rm i￿ s pro￿t, our
analysis demonstrates this is not necessarily the case. An increase in ￿i does, in fact, always
increase ￿rm i￿ s pro￿t because increased clicks on the ￿rm￿ s organic link generate additional
expected sales while imposing no additional costs (per-click) on the ￿rm. However, an in-
crease in ￿i may actually reduce ￿rm pro￿t. In particular, if organic and sponsored links
15This is evident from conditions 1.1 and 2.1 which generate the expressions for ~ pi which are independent
of ￿i and ￿i:
27are strong complements (so ￿i > xi+1=xi+2 in the model),16 then ￿rm i is willing to pay
a cost-per-click which exceeds the expected sale amount vi generated by a customer who
visits the ￿rm￿ s site. If the search engine operator understands the nature of the comple-
mentarity, it will exploit this fact by establishing a minimum cost-per-click which exceeds
vi: As a result, additional clicks on the sponsored link caused by an increase in ￿i will actu-
ally reduce ￿rm pro￿t. Despite the negative expected pro￿t generated by each click on the
￿rm￿ s sponsored link, participation in the keyword auction may still be optimal because the
strong complementarity implies that the increased visibility created by the sponsored link
also leads to a substantial increase in clicks on the ￿rm￿ s organic link which generate sales
with no cost-per-click.
Our analysis also demonstrates how organic links impact a ￿rm￿ s decision to participate
in the keyword auction. This decision relies on a cost-per-click threshold representing the
maximum cost-per-click that a ￿rm is willing to pay for a sponsored link.17 In order for a ￿rm
to participate, the minimum cost-per-click established by the search engine must not exceed
this threshold. Suppose organic and sponsored links are substitutes or weak complements.
If a ￿rm i is optimally participating in the auction, then an increase in the relevance ￿i of
its sponsored link increases ￿rm i￿ s pro￿t and raises its threshold cost-per-click threshold,
which ensures that participation remains optimal. Similarly, an increase in ￿i reduces ￿rm i￿ s
threshold cost-per-click. As ￿i increases, the marginal pro￿t accrued through organic links
when the ￿rm does not participate in the auction is greater than the marginal pro￿t accrued
from organic links when the ￿rm does sponsor a link because of consumer substitution to
clicks on the sponsored link instead of the organic link. Thus, while increasing ￿i raises
the pro￿t of the ￿rms (regardless of whether it participates in the auction), e⁄orts by the
search engine to increase ￿i can be counter productive if organic and sponsored links are
substitutes.
If organic and sponsored links are strong complements, on the other hand, then an
16This case is presented in the discussion of Figure 3.
17Recall from the analysis in subsection 3.1 that this threshold for ￿rm i is either ^ pi or ~ ci if both ￿rms
bid on sponsored links, and is ci if the competing ￿rm j does not bid. It is easily shown that both ^ pi
and ~ ci are decreasing in ￿i and increasing in ￿i if organic links and sponsored links are substitutes or weak
complements (so ￿i < xi+1=xi+2): Similarly, ^ pi and ~ ci are increasing in ￿i and decreasing in ￿i if organic
links and sponsored links are strong complements (so ￿i > xi+1=xi+2): If the competing ￿rm j does not
participate in the auction, then ￿rm i will only participate if the minimum cost-per-click c established by the
search engine does not exceed the threshold ci which is decreasing in ￿i and increasing in ￿i if ￿i < xi=xi+1
and increasing in ￿i and decreasing in ￿i if ￿i > xi=xi+1:
28increase in ￿i reduces the threshold cost-per-click threshold for which participation in the
keyword auction is optimal for ￿rm i. Thus, in the case of strong complementarities, e⁄orts
by the search engine to increase the relevance of sponsored links to consumers may back￿re
and cause ￿rms to stop participating in the auction unless the search engine simultaneously
reduces the minimum cost-per-click. Whether reducing the minimum cost-per-click to ensure
that both ￿rms participate in the auction is optimal for the search engine depends on a variety
of factors as discussed in section 5. An increase in the relevance ￿i of the organic link has
the opposite e⁄ect. If organic and sponsored links are strong complements, then an increase
in ￿i raises ￿rm i￿ s threshold cost-per-click and enables the search engine to extract greater
surplus through the keyword auction. Thus, in the case of strong complementarities, both
the search engine and the ￿rms bidding for sponsored links have an incentive to increase the
relevance ￿i of organic links.
We conclude with an observation on recent changes to Google￿ s AdWords design. Our
analysis highlights the importance of the relevance of organic and sponsored links as well
as the extent to which sponsored and organic links are substitutes or complements to out-
comes in sponsored search auctions. The e⁄ect of search engine and ￿rm strategies to alter
these parameters can impact ￿rm participation and bidding decisions and search engine
pro￿t in a variety of ways. The ongoing modi￿cations by search engines of their sponsored
search auction policies suggest attempts to better understand these complex relationships
and generate greater surplus. For example, Google has recently introduced a new feature in
AdWords which enables a ￿rm to locate a sponsored link adjacent to its organic link. Our
analysis implies that such a strategy can increase total surplus and make both the search
engine and the ￿rm better o⁄ if the sponsored link placement simultaneously makes organic
and sponsored links stronger complements and increases the relevance organic links.
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7.0.1 Proof of equilibrium outcomes
The appendix presents results for mixed strategy equilibria corresponding to conditions in
propositions 5 and 6 as well as a proposition characterizing the equilibrium if sponsored
and organic links are strong complements for one ￿rm j (so ￿j > xj+1=xj+2) and either
substitutes or weak complements for the other ￿rm i (so ￿i < xi+1=xi+2). We ￿rst present
notation regarding equilibria with mixed strategies. Consider the case of ￿i ￿ xi+1=xi+2
and assume ^ pi > c > ~ ci for both ￿rms. Under these conditions each ￿rm only wants to
bid if it will be listed ￿rst, and each ￿rm will bid ^ pi if that bid will win the ￿rst sponsored
link position. However, unless ^ p1 = ^ p2; one of the two ￿rms will win the ￿rst position with
probability 1 and the other ￿rm will choose not to bid. Suppose ^ pi > ^ pj and c < ci: If ￿rm j
sponsors a link, then ￿rm i will sponsor a link because it wins the ￿rst sponsored position,
and if ￿rm j does not sponsor a link, ￿rm i will sponsor because c < ci: Therefore, ￿rm j
knows that it will be in the second sponsored position if it chooses to bid, so it will not bid.
However, if c > ci and ￿rm j decides not to bid because ^ pi > ^ pj; then ￿rm i is better o⁄ not
sponsoring a link and also will choose not to bid. If c > cj; then the fact that ￿rm i chooses
not to bid will not change ￿rm j￿ s decision ￿the conditions of part 4 of proposition 5 are
satis￿ed. However, if ci < c < cj; then a decision by ￿rm i to not bid makes bidding ^ pj a
best response for ￿rm j: But if ￿rm j bids ^ pj; then it is optimal for ￿rm i to bid ^ pi and win
the ￿rst sponsored link position, which then makes not bidding a best response for ￿rm j;
there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. However, there will be an equilibrium in mixed
strategies in which a given ￿rm i bids on a sponsored link with probability qi such that given
the other ￿rm bids with probability qj; ￿rm i￿ s expected pro￿t from a bid of ^ pi is equal to


















j + (1 ￿ qi)￿
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where the pro￿ts are as de￿ned in subsection 2.2 with a CPC of c if only one ￿rm bids
on a sponsored link and the CPC for each ￿rm determined as described in subsection 3.2
30if both ￿rms bid on sponsored links. More generally, a mixed strategy equilibrium will
exist whenever conditions are such that one ￿rm i will bid on a sponsored link given ￿rm
j bids on a sponsored link, but ￿rm j will not bid on a sponsored link if ￿rm i bids, and
cj > c > ci: To calculate the mixed strategy equilibrium, de￿ne ￿
risj
k as the pro￿t of ￿rm
k = i;j when ￿rm i adopts strategy r and ￿rm j adopts strategy s; where pro￿ts are
as de￿ned in subsection 2.2, and the equilibrium CPC is c when only one ￿rm sponsors
a link and CPC amounts are determined by the bids as speci￿ed in subsection 3.2 when
both ￿rms sponsor links. If ￿rm i advertises with probability qi; then if ￿rm j advertises,
￿rm j earns an expected pro￿t of qi￿AAm
j + (1 ￿ qi)￿
NiAj
j , where m 2 f1;2g denotes the
sponsored position that ￿rm j wins in the auction when both ￿rms bid. If ￿rm j does
not advertise, then it earns an expected pro￿t of qi￿
AiNj
j + (1 ￿ qi)￿
NiNj
j : Equating these




















: Note that 0 < qi < 1 because




j ; and the fact that ￿rm j prefers not to advertise over bidding and
being awarded position 2 in the sponsored links implies ￿
AiNj
j > ￿AA2




















: Depending on the bids submitted
by each ￿rm, the sponsored positions awarded to ￿rms i and j could be reversed from those
in equations (3) and (4), e:g:; ￿AA1
i in equation (3) could be ￿AA2
i ; and ￿AA2
j in equation (4)
could be ￿AA2











































for k = 1;2, Thus, qkm is the advertising probability for ￿rm k that makes the other ￿rm,
￿k; indi⁄erent between bidding and not bidding given c < c￿k (so that ￿rm ￿k prefers to





and ￿rm ￿k is awarded sponsored position m if both ￿rms bid, and ~ qkm is the advertising
probability for ￿rm k that makes ￿rm ￿k indi⁄erent between advertising and not advertising




￿k ); and ￿rm ￿k is awarded sponsored position m if both ￿rms
bid.
Proposition 9 Mixed strategy equilibrium when ￿i ￿ xi+1=xi+2 for i = 1;2 with ci < c < ~ ci;
31and ~ cj < c < cj; and ^ pj < maxfhj (~ pi);cg:
1. If c < ^ pj < hj (~ pi); then there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids ~ pi
with probability qi2 and ￿rm j bids ^ pj with probability ~ qj1; and if both ￿rms bid, then
￿rm i is awarded the ￿rst sponsored link position with a CPC of maxfc;hi (^ pj)g and
￿rm j is awarded the second sponsored link position with a CPC of c:
2. If ^ pj < c < hj (~ pi); then there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids ~ pi
with probability qi2 and ￿rm j bids c with probability ~ qj1, and if both ￿rms bid, then ￿rm
i is awarded the ￿rst sponsored link position with a CPC of c and ￿rm j is awarded
the second sponsored link position with a CPC of c:
3. If ^ pj < c; and hj (~ pi) < c; then there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids
~ pi with probability qi2 if i = 1 and qi1 if i = 2 and ￿rm j bids c with probability ~ qj1 if
i = 1 and ~ qj2 if i = 2; and if both ￿rms bid, then ￿rm 1 is awarded the ￿rst sponsored
link position with a CPC of c and ￿rm 2 is awarded the second sponsored link position
with a CPC of c:
Proof. For cases 1 and 2 where c < ^ pj < hj (~ pi) or ^ pj < c < hj (~ pi), note that ￿rm i
prefers to bid if and only if ￿rm j bids (if ￿rm j does not bid, then c > ci implies ￿rm i
prefers not to bid), while ￿rm j prefers to bid if and only if ￿rm i does not (c > ~ cj implies
that if ￿rm i bids, then a bid by ￿rm j is optimal only if ￿rm j will win the ￿rst position
which will not happen because c < ~ ci implies ￿rm i will bid ~ pi if ￿rm j bids, and ^ pj < hj (~ pi)
ensures ￿rm i wins the ￿rst sponsored position when both ￿rms bid). Thus, there is no
pure strategy equilibrium. To calculate the mixed strategy equilibrium, de￿ne ￿
risj
k as the
pro￿t of ￿rm k = i;j when ￿rm i adopts strategy r and ￿rm j adopts strategy s; where
pro￿ts are as de￿ned in subsection 2.2 and the equilibrium CPC is c when only one ￿rm
sponsors a link and CPC amounts are determined by the bids as speci￿ed in subsection
3.2 when both ￿rms sponsor links. If ￿rm i advertises with probability qi; then if ￿rm
j advertises, ￿rm j earns an expected pro￿t of qi￿AA2
j + (1 ￿ qi)￿
NiAj
j and if ￿rm j does
not advertise, then it earns an expected pro￿t of qi￿
AiNj
j + (1 ￿ qi)￿
NiNj
j : Equating these








































= ~ qj1: The third case of c > ^ pj and
c > hj (~ pi) is identical except that when ￿rm j bids c and i bids ~ pi; ￿rm j is listed ￿rst (note
that ￿i < xi+1=xi+2 and c < ~ ci imply c < ~ pi; so ~ pi is the optimal bid for ￿rm i; while c is the
optimal bid for ￿rm j because ￿rm j only wants to sponsor a link if ￿rm i does not), so the
equilibrium mixed strategy probabilities are qi2; and ~ qj1 if i = 1 (because ￿rm 1 is awarded
the ￿rst position when both ￿rms bid), and qi1 and ~ qj2 if i = 2: ￿
Proposition 10 Mixed strategy equilibrium when ￿i > xi+1=xi+2 for i = 1;2.
1. Suppose ^ pi < c < minfci;~ cig and max(cj; ^ pj) < c < ~ cj: If c > hi (c); then there is a
mixed strategy equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids c with probability ~ qi2, ￿rm j bids c with
probability qj1; and ￿rm i is awarded the ￿rst sponsored position if both ￿rms bid.
2. Suppose ci < c < ^ pi and ^ pj < c < cj:
(a) If hj (maxf~ pi;cg) < c < ~ cj; then there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
￿rm i bids maxf~ pi;cg with probability qi1 and ￿rm j bids c with probability ~ qj2;
and if both ￿rms bid, then ￿rm j is awarded the ￿rst sponsored link and ￿rm i is
awarded the second sponsored link position both with a CPC of c:
(b) If ~ cj < c < hj (maxf~ pi;cg); then there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
￿rm i bids maxf~ pi;cg with probability qi2 and ￿rm j bids c with probability ~ qj1,
and if both ￿rms bid, then ￿rm i is awarded the ￿rst sponsored link position with
a CPC of hi (c)and ￿rm j is awarded the second sponsored link position with a
CPC of c:
(c) If c > ~ cj and c > hj (maxf~ pi;cg); then there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in
which ￿rm i bids maxf~ pi;cg with probability qi1 and ￿rm j bids c with probability
~ qj2, and if both ￿rms bid, then ￿rm i is awarded the second sponsored link and
￿rm j is awarded the ￿rst sponsored link position both with a CPC of c:
Proof. For case 1 note that ^ pi < c < minfci;~ cig implies that it is only optimal for ￿rm
i to bid when ￿rm j bids if i will be awarded the second sponsored position, and it is always
optimal for i to bid if j does not. Similarly, max(cj; ^ pj) < c < ~ cj implies that it is optimal
for ￿rm j to bid when ￿rm i bids if ￿rm j will be awarded the second sponsored position,
33and it is never optimal for ￿rm j to bid if ￿rm i does not. Also, it because c > ^ pi and
c > ^ pj; both ￿rms will bid c if they bid. Because c > hi (c) implies that ￿rm i will win the
￿rst sponsored position when both bid, ￿rm i never wants to bid if ￿rm j bids, and because
c > cj; ￿rm j never wants to bid if ￿rm i does not bid. It follows that no pure strategy
equilibrium exists, and because ￿rm i wins the ￿rst position when both bid and cj < c < ci;
the equilibrium mixed strategies are ~ qi2 and qj1: For case 2 note that ci < c < ^ pi implies that
it is always optimal for ￿rm i to bid if ￿rm j bids and not optimal for ￿rm i to bid if ￿rm j
does not. Similarly ^ pj < c < cj implies it is only optimal for ￿rm j to bid when ￿rm i bids
if ￿rm c < ~ cj and ￿rm j is awarded the second sponsored position and it is always optimal
for ￿rm j to bid if ￿rm i does not. Because c < ^ pi; ￿rm i will bid maxf~ pi;cg when it bids,
and because c < ^ pj; ￿rm j will bid c when it bids. For case 2a; c > hj (maxf~ pi;cg) implies
￿rm j wins the ￿rst position when both bid, so there is no pure strategy equilibrium and
because ci < c < cj; the equilibrium mixed strategies are ~ qj1 and qi2: In case 2b; ￿rm j wins
the second sponsored position when both ￿rms bid, but because c > ~ cj; ￿rm j is better o⁄
not bidding at all when ￿rm i bids, so again there is no pure strategy equilibrium and the
equilibrium mixed strategies are qi2 and ~ qj1: Finally, in case 2c ￿rm j wins the ￿rst position
when both bid, so the equilibrium is the same as in part 2a: ￿
Finally, similar arguments to those presented above imply the following proposition for
the case in which organic and sponsored links are strong complements for one ￿rm j and
either substitutes or weak complements for the other ￿rm i:
Proposition 11 Suppose that ￿i < xi+1=xi+2 for one ￿rm i and ￿j > xj+1=xj+2 for the
other ￿rm j:
1. If c ￿ min(ci;~ ci;cj; ^ pj); then there is a unique equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids ~ pi and
￿rm j bids maxf~ pj;cg for sponsored links.
2. If max(c1;c2) < c < min(~ ci; ^ pj); then there are two pure strategy equilibria; in one
equilibrium, neither ￿rm bids on sponsored links, and in the other equilibrium ￿rm i
bids ~ pi and ￿rm j bids maxf~ pj;cg:
3. If max(ci; ^ pi) < c < cj; then ￿rm j sponsors a link and ￿rm i does not. If max(cj;~ cj) <
c < ci; then ￿rm i sponsors a link and ￿rm j does not.
344. Suppose ci < c < cj and ^ pj < c < ^ pi: If c < ~ cj; and c <
￿i
￿j minf~ pi; ^ pig +
x2c(￿j￿￿i)
￿jx1 ; then
there is a unique equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids minf~ pi; ^ pig; ￿rm j bids c; and ￿rm i is
awarded the ￿rst sponsored link. If c ￿ ~ cj and c <
￿i
￿j minf~ pi; ^ pig+
x2c(￿j￿￿i)
￿jx1 ; then there
is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which ￿rm i bids minf~ pi; ^ pig with probability qi2 and
￿rm j bids c with probability qj1;and if both ￿rms bid, then ￿rm i is awarded the ￿rst








and ￿rm j is awarded
the second sponsored link position with a CPC of c: If c < ~ ci (and c < ~ cj or c > ~ cj);
and c >
￿i
￿j minf~ pi; ^ pig +
x2c(￿j￿￿i)
￿jx1 ; then there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
￿rm i bids minf~ pi; ^ pig with probability qi1 and ￿rm j bids c with probability qj2, and if
both ￿rms bid, then ￿rm j is awarded the ￿rst sponsored link and ￿rm i is awarded the
second sponsored link position both with a CPC of c: If c > ~ ci (and c < ~ cj or c > ~ cj);
and c >
￿i
￿j minf~ pi; ^ pig +
x2c(￿j￿￿i)
￿jx1 ; then only ￿rm i bids and submits a bid of c:





￿rm i bids minf~ pi; ^ pig; ￿rm j bids c; and ￿rm i is awarded the ￿rst sponsored link. If




￿ix1 ; then only ￿rm i bids. Proof: for these values of c; ￿rm
i only wants to bid if it will be listed ￿rst and ￿rm j only wants to bid if it will be
second. Furthermore, if ￿rm j does not bid, ￿rm i will bid to have the only sponsored
link because c < ci, while if ￿rm i does not bid, ￿rm j will not bid because c > cj:
Because c < ^ pi; ￿rm i bids minf~ pi; ^ pig when it does bid, and because c > ^ pj; ￿rm j




￿ix1 ; then ￿rm i is ￿rst when both




￿ix1 ; then ￿rm
j would be ￿rst, so ￿rm j will not bid if ￿rm i bids, but it is optimal for ￿rm i to bid
when ￿rm j does not, so ￿rm i bids and ￿rm j does not.
5. If c > max(c1;c2) and c > min(^ p1; ^ p2) then neither ￿rm bids on sponsored links.
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